This research shows that certain time-dependent congestion reduction schemes involving tolls have the potential for benefiting every driver even if the collected revenues are not returned to the payers. The paper considers a population of commuters who use a single bottleneck during the morning rush hour and try to arrive at work on time. It is assumed that the number of commuters is fixed (independent of the control strategy) and that each commuter wishes to pass through the bottleneck at a given time, which may differ across commuters. Commuters are otherwise identical.
INTRODUCTION
This paper proposes and evaluates an unconventional pricing scheme for the time-dependent "morning commute problem" that has the potential for being Pareto improving. Interest in congestion pricing is currently high because both the public and government officials are increasingly aware of the high costs of urban congestion and the limitations of more conventional congestion reduction remedies. [Even though congestion cost estimates must be treated with caution, recent analyses leave no doubt that congestion is a pressing problem: the annual cost of delays in the 10 most snarled city and suburban road systems in the US has been estimated to be on the order of $34 billion (SCHRANK and LOMAX, 1997 .)] The paper is motivated by the recognition that conventional congestion pricing strategies involve transfer payments that hurt (or at least do not benefit) the majority of users, and the belief that reducing these inequities can go a long way toward eliminating the public's reluctance to accept tolls.
Some of these issues have already been explored in the context of a steady state (static) system. It has been suggested in DAGANZO (1995) that if certain procedures were implemented (citywide) in a perennially congested city, then a Pareto improvement could be achieved. The assumptions about user behavior made in this reference were rather general, but the traffic model (being steady state) ruled out surgical application of the procedure to "hot spots" that are only congested part of the day. In view of this, some modifications that would be appropriate for these cases are outlined in this paper. They will be illustrated below with the simplest possible "hot spot" scenario; i.e., the so-called "morning commute problem with homogeneous drivers," introduced in VICKREY (1969) and also examined in HENDRICKSON et al. (1983) , SMITH (1984) , DAGANZO (1985) and ARNOTT et al. (1990) , among others. (A thorough understanding of this simple case is a prerequisite to the investigation of more realistic scenarios; e.g., with heterogeneous drivers, different vehicle types and some cheating.) Section 1 below summarizes the necessary background from these references.
Section 2 describes the proposed strategy, and Sec. 3 examines the equilibrium state obtained 1 Because all the times in this paper refer to the bottleneck, the words "arrival" and "departure" also refer to the bottleneck. This is consistent with queuing theory usage but opposite to the economic literature in which authors talk about departures from home (our arrivals) and arrivals at work (our departures).
as a result of its application, assuming that all the commuters wish to pass through the bottleneck at the same time. It is shown in this section that the proposed strategy, unlike pure pricing alone, can achieve some benefit even if the tolls are not returned to the population. Section 4 then shows that similar policies can also yield Pareto improving results for a population of commuters with different desired passage times. A policy exists that maximizes the benefit to every driver, and where the benefits are distributed equally across drivers. On any given day the policy can reduce the total queuing delay (congestion) by as much as 25% without changing the flow through the bottleneck.
The paper ends with a discussion of implementation issues and possible generalizations.
BACKGROUND
Assume that N users (i = 1, ... N) wish to pass through a bottleneck with the following features: (i) a time-independent capacity, µ, expressed in vehicles per unit time, (ii) service on a firstin-first-out basis (FIFO discipline) and (iii) an overall behavior that can be approximated with the standard fluid model of queuing theory; see, e.g., NEWELL (1982) . Recall that in the fluid approximation model "i" is treated as a continuous (real) variable, i 0 [0, N] . This convention is also adopted below. In addition, it will be assumed for simplicity of notation that time is measured in a system of units such that µ = 1.
Assume as well that the bottleneck is the main source of congestion for the user population such as it occurs with the Golden Gate Bridge in the San Francisco Bay Area. The user population is allowed to have different origins and destinations as long as the trip times between these locations and the bottleneck are fixed. This allows us to define for each user, i, an ideal time of passing through the bottleneck, w i , which would ensure that the user arrives at the final destination when desired. This information can be encapsulated graphically by means of a smooth function that returns w i for every i, w i = T W (i). Assuming without loss of generality that the users have been numbered in order of increasing w so that T W is monotonic increasing, we can also define an inverse function W(t) that identifies the user number wishing to depart at t; i.e., the cumulative number of users with desired passage times earlier than t. 1 3 Because the queue is FIFO, p i is also the departure position of user i. Curve "A" is obtained by plotting p i vs a i : i.e., p i = A(a i ). Curve "D" is the highest smooth curve with slope less than or equal to 1 that does not exceed "A".
We assume that each commuter chooses an arrival time to the queue, a i , that minimizes a linear combination of money and the times spent in different states (in the queue and at the destination, either early or late) recognizing that the various states are not valued equally. This "generalized cost" can be expressed in any units we wish, provided that the results are only used to compare costs for a specific commuter before and after control. Thus, time in queue is chosen as our measurement scale for cost because this eliminates another parameter (the value of time in queue) from the formulation. The unpunctuality penalty for a commuter, i, that departs the bottleneck at time t is assumed to be:
where e and L are the conversion rates for earliness and lateness into queuing time. These rates are assumed to be the same across commuters and to satisfy e # 1 < L. 2 SMALL (1982) estimates L/e .
3.9.
Define an "assignment" as a set of arrival times to the bottleneck for all commuters: {a i }.
Given {a i } it is possible to determine the arrival position p i of every commuter and to construct monotonic curves for the cumulative number of users to have arrived and departed by time t, A(t) and D(t), using the rules of the bottleneck. 
In other words, p i = argmin C i (p).
If no tolls are imposed, then for suitable convex penalty functions of which Eq. (1) is an example, an equilibrium exists (SMITH, 1984) and is unique (DAGANZO, 1985) . At such an equilibrium commuters arrive in the desired order of departure, "first-deadline-first-in" (FDFI.); i.e., p i = i. The references show that in an equilibrium the three curves "A," "D" and "W" coincide when there is no queue and that the "W" curve must divide the queuing ( To see that such a set of curves is an FDFI equilibrium one needs to verify that (2) reaches a minimum when p = i. This can be seen from the figure by examining the rates at which the queuing delay and the unpunctuality penalty change as the arrival position p is moved away from i, for any fixed (i, w i ) pair.
In this equilibrium, the user departing in position p = x (where curves "D" and "W" intersect) experiences zero unpunctuality but maximum queuing time; i.e., C x = z, where:
as per the geometry of Fig. 1 . If the commuters share the same deadline, so that "W" is a step function, then the generalized cost is the same for everybody, and C i = z for all i.
The geometry of the figure also reveals that the numbers of commuters departing early and late, x and y, are:
x = NL/(e+L) (3b) and y = Ne/(e+L).
It has been pointed out (NEWELL, 1987) that if a time-dependent toll equivalent to the queuing delay is collected at the bottleneck, then an equilibrium would develop where people continue to make the same trips and pass the bottleneck at the same time. Vehicles would arrive just in time for
Recall that the toll is calculated based on the time when the vehicle passes the bottleneck, which cannot be predicted exactly in real life.
their "scheduled" departure. Queuing delay would have been eliminated but commuters would pay an equivalent monetary penalty. As a result, they would experience no gain, ignoring of course any indirect benefits they may receive from the collected revenues. Thus, an incentive exists for finding modified strategies that would generate Pareto improvements.
Sections 2 and 3 below show that in an idealized scenario where all the commuters are identical there is a pricing strategy that benefits all the commuters even if the indirect benefits of the revenues are ignored. Section 2 presents the strategy and Section 3 its results.
A POSSIBLE STRATEGY
The idea is to encourage turn-taking by tolling the population selectively and equitably. To do this one introduces an arbitrary number of toll classes, k, to which the population is assigned. The assignment method is such that: (i) in the long-run the fraction of days f k that a commuter spends in class k is the same for all commuters, and (ii) the fraction of commuters in class k is f k every day.
It is theoretically possible to eliminate queues with this approach by: (i) defining one class for each minute (or an otherwise short time slice) of the rush hour, (ii) setting f k equal to the fraction of the population that passes the bottleneck in slice k of the untolled equilibrium, and (iii) introducing a class-specific toll that is zero for departures within the slice and very high outside. This scheme should have the same effect as issuing appointments to use the bottleneck. Indeed, consideration shows that under these conditions an arrival pattern where everyone arrives within their appointed time slice is an equilibrium in which there is no queuing and no tolls are paid. Note that this equilibrium would be Pareto improving even if the value of time varied across the population.
Although the pricing scheme just described is obviously impractical because it is too complex and authoritarian, its theoretical effectiveness suggests that Pareto improvements may be achieved with simpler versions of the scheme.
The simplest possible approach would include only two customer classes and a single time window [W B , W E ]. DAGANZO (1992) examined the special case where W E = 4, and showed that Pareto improvements were possible with a toll that varied continuously with time. Continuity is desirable as a practical matter to ensure that small deviations from a commuter's plans due to the vagaries of traffic only result in small variations in the toll.
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5 Allowing one of the classes to go untolled is desirable to allow "poor" people to avoid the toll. This makes it more likely that the strategy will be Pareto improving with a population of varying "tastes". (Although this paper focuses on homogeneous populations, we hope to relax this assumption in the future.)
The sections below extend the results in DAGANZO (1992) by allowing W E to be finite. As in that reference, it is assumed that one of the classes, labeled "free" and including a fraction f of the population, is not tolled. The other class, labeled "paying" and including the remaining fraction (1-f), experiences a continuous toll. 5 The toll is assumed to be proportional to the time separation between the moment of bottleneck passage and the closest end of the time window. The proportionality constant, J, is expressed in units of queuing time per unit of time separation and is assumed to be the same across drivers (homogenous population). That is, the toll penalty for a paying user departing the bottleneck inside the time window at time d is:
Thus, the "system manager" can choose 4 free parameters: (i) the toll rate, J; (ii) the time window,
[W B , W E ], and (iii) the fraction of "free" commuters, f. It will be shown in the next two sections that these 4 parameters can be chosen so as to achieve a Pareto improving equilibrium.
We believe that the proposed strategy can be implemented with current technology. For example, each commuter could have a non-transferable electronic tag attached to his/her car that would be linked to its license plate. Ideally, the code on the electronic tag would be similar for cars registered to the same city block, and cars with similar codes would be assigned to the same population class so as to share "free" days. This would discourage the trading of cars within families, neighbors and other forms of arbitrage. Tolls could be collected electronically. Random checks and stiff fines could be applied to discourage cheating (e.g., tag tampering). Additional implementability issues are discussed in DAGANZO (1995) and later in this paper. The results of the strategy are discussed next.
HOMOGENEOUS POPULATION WITH A SINGLE DESIRED DEADLINE
Consider here the case where all the commuters have the same desired deadline; i.e., where W(t) is a step function. It will be shown in this section that there is a combination of parameters that achieves an equilibrium, as shown by the "A" and "D" curves of Fig. 2 . For convenience of notation and without loss of generality, the origin of coordinates on this diagram has been placed at the point where the curves "W" and "D" intersect. Thus, our variable p now ranges from -x to +y. The equilibrium of Fig. 2 is assumed to have the following properties:
(i) The departure curve is the same as the original, without the controls.
(ii) The arrival curve matches the original curve (dotted line, A(t) old ) at the beginning and end of the rush but exhibits three distinct queuing episodes and less delay overall. The middle episode is geometrically similar to the original (before control) but includes only Nf customers; the middle "A" curve is obtained by translating "A old " to the right by (1-f )z. 
and a ii = 1/(1+L) < 1 (for segments NM and DC).
It should be clear from property (ii) that the f N free customers would be in equilibrium in the middle queuing episode because the queuing pattern for this episode is the same as one would have obtained with the theory of Sec. 1 for a population of size f N. We now show that for any f 0 (0, 1) one can always find a toll rate J and a time window [W B , W E ] such that the paying commuters will be in an equilibrium by arriving in the first and third queuing episodes, thereby satisfying property (iv).
To do this we imagine that the middle queuing episode has been given, and then draw lines through points A and C with slopes a iii and a iv given by the following formulae and constraints:
0 < a iii = 1/(1+J-e) < 1 (for the line through point A) (5a) and a iv = 1/(1+L-J) > 1 (for the line through point C).
We see from (5b) that this will be possible only if J satisfies:
Likewise, (5a) implies that J > e but insofar as L > e this condition is redundant with (6) and can be ignored. We now show how to choose the time window for any J satisfying (6).
With slopes constrained by inequalities (5), the two slanted lines through points A and C will intersect curve A(t) old at two well defined points, such as E and N of Fig. 2 . Horizontal lines drawn through these points will in turn intersect the D(t) curve at two points, such as G and Q of Fig. 2 .
We choose W B and W E as the abscissas of these two points; see Fig. 2 .
To show that this geometric construction is a segregated equilibrium it suffices to show that the (1-f )N arrival positions spanned by lines FEA and CNM are equally attractive to the (1-f )N paying users, and that these positions are preferable to those in the middle queuing episode.
To see this note that arrivals in FE and NM, which pay no tolls because they depart outside the time window, experience the same queuing delay and unpunctuality penalty as in the uncontrolled equilibrium. Therefore, their generalized cost for arriving in any of these positions is z. We now show that this is also the cost experienced by the toll-paying arrivals in segments EA and CN. Since generalized cost varies continuously with position, it suffices to show that paying users would be indifferent to arrival positions within EA, and also within CN. Within EA, earliness decreases with position at rate e and the toll increases at rate J. The ensuing cost increase is perfectly balanced by the decline in queuing time, which can be shown to decrease at rate J -e. (This rate is simply the difference in the reciprocals of the slopes of the A(t) and D(t) curves; i.e.: 1/a iii -1 = (1+J-e) -1 = J -e.) Therefore, paying users are indifferent to all points within EA. The same logic reveals that paying users are also indifferent to all points within CN. Thus, all arrival points on FEA and CNM are equivalent for paying users.
Paying users are in equilibrium by arriving on the FEA and CNM curves because arriving in the middle queuing episode (ADC) is less appealing to them than arriving at either one of its extreme points (A or C). This is true because in the middle queuing episode non-monetary costs are perfectly balanced but tolls increase toward its middle. Therefore, the steps we introduced to choose J, W B
and W E for any f identify a segregated equilibrium. Figure 3 shows how the generalized cost of both free and paying users varies with departure time for this equilibrium. Note that the two user costs on paying days and free days are:
User cost on paying days = z (same as before) (7a) User cost on free days = f z.
(less than before) (7b)
That is, every user saves (1-f )z units of queuing delay on free days. This is equal to the horizontal displacement of the middle portion of the "A" curve from the original equilibrium curve "A old ." Therefore, the shaded area in Fig. 2 represents the total savings achieved in any given day.
Since users are free 100 f % of the days, the long run average saved per day per user (the normalized shaded area) is:
The savings are only a function of f and reach a maximum of 0.25z for f = 0.5. Figure 4 illustrates that savings would be small for both small and large f. Note that a strategy of pure pricing ( f = 0 ) results in no benefit. Note as well that tolls are only collected at the beginning and end of the time window; e.g., from the customers departing along segments GA and CQ in Fig. 2 .
We believe that these results can be extended, at least approximately, to general scenarios with heterogeneous population groups; e.g., to real situations where current and potential users of the bottleneck have different desired deadlines, different valuations of the generalized cost components, different travel alternatives, and where the demand is elastic. We are hopeful because, as is shown below, the results remain valid if users have different desired deadlines.
DIFFERENT DESIRED DEADLINES
It is assumed here that the desired deadline curve "W" increases in a S-shape form as suggested in SMITH (1984); e.g., its derivative may increase to a maximum value greater than 1, remain there for a while and finally decline from that level. It will be shown that if all the commuters have deadlines in a narrow window of prespecified width (i.e., "W" is moderately steep) then the solution identified in Sec. 3 continues to be an equilibrium if the customers in each class arrive in a FDFI order. This equilibrium is still Pareto improving, and Eq. (8) applies. The savings in this case continue to be equal for all users independent of their deadlines. Figure 5 shows an equilibrium (arrival and departure curves) that satisfies the conditions of Sec. 3. It also shows a hypothetical "W" curve with earliest and latest deadlines, w min = T W (-x) and w max = T W (y), that satisfy the following "steepness condition":
w min > -x and w max < y.
We will see that any strategy of the form presented in Sec. 3 is Pareto improving for this problem if, as shown in the figure, the proportion of free users f is large enough to satisfy:
Geometrically, this means that the middle queuing episode should include the time interval from w min to w max , as shown in Fig. 5 . A non-trivial f satisfying (10) can always be found if (9) holds. That the equilibrium of Sec. 3 with a step W(t) is also an equilibrium now under class-specific FDFI follows from the following:
(a) The deadline curve of free commuters, W f (t) = f W(t), would pass through the queue dissipation points A and C and would divide the departure curve into two chords of similar lengths as before. Thus, insofar as free users arrive in a FDFI order, they would be in equilibrium during the middle queuing episode, as per the rationale of Sec. 1.
(b) Because all the positions in the first queuing episode imply earliness (as per (10a); see This establishes that every commuter would take the same action with a smooth deadline function as (s)he would have taken with a step function, and that this is true for both the controlled and uncontrolled scenarios. Therefore, the improvement introduced by the control cannot depend on the shape of "W" for any user. As a result, Eq. (8) still applies. The largest benefit is obtained by maximizing (8) subject to (10). Clearly, the maximum theoretical benefit (savings = .25z for f = 0.5) can only be achieved if the tails of "W" are short ( w min > -0.5x and w max < .5y ). Otherwise, a smaller Pareto improvement can be obtained with a large f.
Note that both the improvement for large f and the remaining control variables needed to achieve it are independent of "W." This is fortunate because it means that knowledge of the deadline curve is not necessary to devise a strategy. Furthermore, it means that the proposed strategy can be introduced gradually, starting with a wide time window and a small percentage of restricted commuters. The resulting effect on the arrival curve can be monitored easily. With this diagnostic, one can then decide (with the public's consent) whether narrower windows and lower values of f should be pursued.
If "W" is so shallow that (9) is violated, there may be free users who would like to depart in the extreme queuing episodes, and this may preclude perfect class segregation with class-specific FDFI. Whether this rules out perfect Pareto improvements is not known. In any case, and given the choice flexibility users have with the proposed pricing approach, one would expect a more equitable distribution of gains and losses.
CONCLUSIONS
As explained above, the proposed policy is attractive because it requires few data and can be implemented gradually. Of course, questions still remain. The following is a partial list that should be researched in the near future:
(1) How should un-instrumented vehicles be treated, e.g., to prevent widespread cheating by drivers of instrumented vehicles? (This would be important for the purposes of doing a small pilot study.) 6 These exemptions are different from changing f because commuters could choose the days in which they are exempted; e.g., due to emergency.
(2) Should a few exemptions be given to everyone each year? How many? 
Could the strategy be introduced gradually? And could the public's reaction to each policy modification be used to gauge the distribution of benefits at each step, as well as the desirability and nature of yet another small modification?
Could similar strategies be effective if other forms of travel such as alternative routes can be used to bypass the bottleneck? As explained in (DAGANZO, 1995) this question is the same as (5) if the alternative routes are not congested.
(9) Could the methodology be extended to more general desired deadline curves, perhaps also including non-commuting drivers whose arrival times at the queue are given?
If these questions have favorable answers and the most relevant of these can be communicated believably to the public, then adoption of pricing could be less dependent on the particular politics of a locality. This could perhaps mean that congestion could be reduced equitably in many bottlenecks around the world.
Much more drastic strategies, such as rationing access to city centers by license plate, have already been applied in Caracas, Paris, São Paulo, Athens and other cities. The proposed policy can be viewed as a hybrid of pricing and rationing; so it is not very different from other things that are already being done. It should be more attractive than pure pricing or pure rationing because it gives people more options. Furthermore, it can be implemented surgically in specific locations; e.g., to increase the usage of underutilized car-pool lanes. Fig.1 . Cumulativearrival,departureanddesireddeadlinecurvesforanequilibrium. 
